



## Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION APR-14

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INFO AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
& AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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EO 11652: 008

TBS: PARA MILICUUR

SUBJ: CUBA, MOSCOW, AND TREATY OF TELTELCO

X 1C PARM

10A 15

1. BREZHNEV'S APRIL 25 KOMSOMOL SPEECH ASSURANCE THAT SOVIETS WILL APPARENTLY ADHERE TO PROTOCOL II OF TREATY OF TELTELCO IS CITED ONLY BRIEFLY, IN PASSING, IN APRIL 26 HAVANA. SOVIET-CUBAN COMMUNIQUE (ISSUED AT CONCLUSION OF PALMIERA VISIT TO USSR) TOTALLY OMITS MENTION OF SOVIET MOVE TO ADHERE TO TELTELCO. PRESUMING THAT SOVIETS BRIEFED CUBANS, WE VIEW NON-INCLUSION IN COMMUNIQUE AS EVIDENCE THAT CUBANS FOR PRESENT ARE STILL MAKING TELTELCO SIGNATURE CONTINGENT ON IMPROVEMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH US (SEE HAVANA 963). COMMENT: SOVIET CUBAN COMMUNIQUE'S MENTION OF LIFTING OF EMBARGO AND RETURN OF QUANTUM MO MAY BE INDICATION OF CUBAN MINIMUM CONDITIONS.)

2. AT SAME TIME, WHILE MOSCOW CLEARLY HAS MOTIVES FOR APPEARING TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM CUBA (IN LIGHT OF WESTERN FUROR OVER HORN OF AFRICA SITUATION) AND TO CURRY MEXICO'S FAVOR (IN LIGHT OF LOPEZ PORTILLO'S UPCOMING VISIT), WE DOUBT STRONGLY WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD HAVE MOVED ON TELTELCO WITHOUT AT LEAST GESTURE OF ACQUIESCEENCE BY CUBANS.

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Therefore, we assume that Cubans may  
have indicated their willingness to tolerate Soviet domination  
and may, indeed, be resigned to eventual formal relegation  
of Cuba to non-nuclear status. (Comment: Cubans have already  
stated that they will accept IAEA safeguards on nuclear  
generating station which Soviets will begin installing in  
next few years. We note also that Soviet-Cuban communique  
endorses Soviet efforts to reach CTB.)

3. Soviet decision to adhere to Tlatelolco, coming so  
soon after renewed Western rumors of Soviet nuclear base  
construction at Cienfuegos, does have profound significance

[ ] On nature of Soviet military use  
of Cuba. It is, therefore, an important symbolic gesture  
toward meeting US security concerns with regard to  
Cuba. While protocol II will not ban future port calls  
by Soviet nuclear-capable ships or aircraft visits  
by nuclear-capable aircraft (e.g., Backfire).  
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